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Authority and Harm1 
 
This paper explores the connections between two central topics in moral and political 
philosophy: the moral legitimacy of authority and the ethics of causing harm. Each of 
these has been extensively discussed in isolation, but relatively little work has 
considered the implications of certain views about authority for theories of permissible 
harming, and vice versa.2 As I aim to show, reflection on the relationship between these 
two topics reveals that certain common views about, respectively, the justification of 
harm and the moral limits of authority require revision. The paper proceeds as follows. 
Sections 1 and 2 clarify the question to be addressed and set out two main claims that I 
will defend. Sections 3-5 argue for the first claim. Sections 6-9 defend the second. 
Section 10 concludes. 
 
1. The Central Question 
The core concern within the ethics of harm is obvious. Though harming others is 
normally morally prohibited, under certain conditions it is intuitively permissible, or 
even required. Theories of harm aim to provide a systematic account of the factors that 
determine when these exceptions arise.  
The theorist of authority, by contrast, is concerned with the fact that certain persons 
and institutions claim to possess the moral power to issue commands and, by doing so, 
place others under obligations to act in certain ways. Paradigmatic examples include a 
parent directing their child to ‘Clean up your room!’, a policewoman ordering a car 
driver to ‘Stop right there!’, and a colonel commanding his troops to ‘Hold your 
positions!’. At a more general level, states and legal systems claim to create obligations 
by enacting laws and through the pronouncements of officials. In all these cases, the 
commander purports to create new ‘content-independent’ reasons for action, over and 
above the subject’s pre-existing reasons for and against the action commanded. 
Furthermore, these new reasons claim a privileged status in the subject’s practical 
deliberation. They are not simply to be weighed alongside all her pre-existing reasons, 
but are instead intended to silence or ‘pre-empt’ (at least some of) those reasons, 
preventing them from bearing on how she now ought to act. 
Despite the ubiquity of authority claims, there is a clear puzzle as to how they could 
be true. Put simply: How can I acquire something as morally serious as an obligation 
just by someone communicating her intention that it be the case?3 A theory of authority 
then faces two closely related tasks. The first is to identify the conditions, if any, under 
which this power is morally justified and obedience therefore required. The second is 
to provide an account of its moral limits, since obligations to obey are presumably 
neither unconditional nor absolute.  
Despite their different objects of justification – harm vs. obedience – these two 
topics are ultimately concerned with what moral reasons agents have; with what 
individuals all-things-considered ought and ought not to do. Given this, there is a range 
of cases in which answering these questions requires determining how our accounts of 
harm and of authority interact with one another. These are cases in which an authority’s 
command requires its subject to cause, or refraining from causing, harm to others. 
	 2	
Under what conditions, if any, do these commands give subjects all-things-considered 
reason to obey? This is no hypothetical question. For example, members of law 
enforcement and military organizations are routinely subject to such commands. The 
question is most striking in the case of commands to perform acts of harming that would 
be morally prohibited in the absence of the command. Here, two putative sources of 
obligations require opposing actions. A theory of authority or harm will be incomplete 
unless it tells us how conflicts like this should be resolved, by providing an account of 
the extent (if any) to which authoritative commands can affect the moral status of 
harmful actions. 
 
2. Two Claims 
To demonstrate the relevance of authority I focus on two specific debates within the 
ethics of harm. The first is the very general question of identifying the range of 
considerations that are capable of justifying harm. On a fairly standard view, the 
stringent constraint on harming is explained in terms of individuals having basic rights 
against harm. Given this, justifications for harming are thought to take one of two basic 
forms. The first is that the individual harmed lacks their normal right against harm, and 
so harming them does not wrong them. For example, they may have waived their right 
(as in the case of boxing matches), forfeited their right in virtue of some prior 
wrongdoing (as in the case of punishment), or rendered themselves liable to harm in 
virtue of posing an unjust threat to others (as in cases of self- and other-defense). A 
second form of justification holds that individuals’ rights not to be harmed can be 
overridden by weightier moral reasons. Most obviously, that harming a person directly 
prevents a much greater harm to others. In these cases, harm is justified as the 
(impartial) lesser-evil.4  
The above are often classified as agent-neutral justifications, in that they do not 
make essential reference to any particular agents to whom they apply.5 For example, if 
John is liable to defensive killing, or if killing John will save many innocent lives, then 
any agent may potentially act on these justifications. In addition, some theorists defend 
the existence of agent-relative justifications, which apply only to particular agents.6 
These are typically grounded in considerations of permissible partiality. On this view, 
when certain agent-relative reasons – such as protecting oneself and one’s loved ones 
– come into conflict with respecting others’ rights not to be harmed, the agent-relative 
reason may sometimes be weightier. Given its structure, this can be understood as a 
distinct species of lesser-evil justification (Lazar, 2013).  
While the precise range of justifications for harming is much debated, it is generally 
assumed that the above candidates exhaust the possibilities.7 Term this view 
Completeness. 
The second debate arises within discussions of defensive harm. It concerns the 
permissibility of using defensive force against individuals who threaten unjust harm to 
others, but possess an all-things-considered justification for doing so. This issue rests 
on a more general question regarding how different agents’ reasons for causing harming 
interact with one another. While it seems plausible that an agent’s justification gives 
others some reason not to defensively harm them, debate centers on the extent to which 
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the justificatory burden is raised. On one prominent (but by no means universal) view 
there can be no justified defense against justified infringements of rights against harm.8 
Term this view Immunity. 
I will argue that extending a certain view of the justification of authority into the 
domain of harm generates counter-examples to both Completeness and Immunity. To 
do so, I defend two specific claims. Firstly, I defend the strong claim that, under certain 
conditions, the command of an authority can provide an agent with a moral justification 
for causing harm, even in cases where the harm both transgresses rights and fails to 
bring about goods sufficient to override those rights. This claim thus denies 
Completeness, positing an additional ‘authority-based’ form of justification.9 
With the first claim in place, I shift from the question of the normative situation of 
those subject to commands to cause harm, to those who are threatened with harm by 
authorized agents. In particular, I consider the permissibility of defensively harming 
such agents. I defend a second claim, which holds that an agent’s having an authority-
based justification for harming does not, in itself, raise the justificatory burden on 
defensively harming that agent, compared to if they lacked that justification. This claim 
thus denies Immunity.  
 
3. Opposing the First Claim  
I anticipate many will find my first claim highly unintuitive, even repugnant. To begin 
a defense of this claim, I will outline three broad views about authority that support this 
common-sense reaction.  
At the most general level, one might endorse philosophical anarchism and deny that 
the commands of authorities ever create reasons for action. This challenge is often 
stated in the form of a paradox, starting from the plausible assumption that agents 
should always act in accordance with the balance of reasons that apply to them.10 Given 
this, in cases where an authority commands acting against the balance of reasons, 
obeying the command seems to involve acting against reason. If, on the other hand, we 
are commanded to act as reason recommends, then we ought to do so, but not because 
we have been commanded. From the perspective of practical reason, commands are 
either redundant or pernicious.   
However, endorsing anarchism simply in order to resist my first claim does seem a 
case of killing the baby to save the bathwater. Fortunately, a more moderate, and 
plausible, strategy is available. This accepts that there is some successful response to 
the anarchist’s challenge – so that some authorities are capable of creating some 
obligations – and instead appeals to the moral limits of that power. This is a very natural 
position to take. It seems obvious that wherever the precise limits lie, commands to 
cause harm that would otherwise be morally unjustified surely exceed them, given the 
gravity of the wrongdoing involved. As Matthew Noah Smith puts it in a recent article,  
 
The first characteristic of the obligation to obey the law is that there are 
very few limits on what an obligation to obey the law can require a subject 
to do. There are, of course, some limits. Presumably, if obedience to the 
law requires commission of serious moral wrongs, then one is not obligated 
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to obey the law. But this limit is at the moral extremes.” (Smith, 2013, 
p.349) (my emphasis) 
 
This common thought supports two distinct objections to my first claim, corresponding 
to two different ways in which the obligation to obey a legitimate authority is limited.11 
The Invalidation Objection holds that the obligation to obey is necessarily voided when 
the authority’s commands require actions that would otherwise be seriously morally 
wrong.12 These commands create no reasons to obey. By contrast, the Pro Tanto 
Objection grants that such commands may succeed in creating obligations, but holds 
that these obligations are necessarily overridden by the subject’s weightier duty not to 
cause serious harm to others.13 
 
3. Service Justifications of Authority 
In order to defend my first claim, a plausible account of authority is needed that reveals 
all three objections to be mistaken. This requires two components. Firstly, in response 
to the anarchist, we need an account of how one person’s authority over another – 
understood as the moral power to create content-independent and peremptory 
obligations – can be morally justified. Secondly, in response to the Invalidation and Pro 
Tanto objections, it needs to be shown that commands to inflict unjustified harm need 
not necessarily exceed the moral limits of authority. I will argue that ‘service’ accounts 
of authority are able to satisfy both these requirements. On this view, very roughly, one 
agent’s having authority over another can be justified when, and to the extent that, the 
authority having this moral power serves the subject’s ends.  
Let me begin by outlining Joseph Raz’s well-known argument for justifying 
authority in this way (Raz, 1986). This advances two main theses. The first (‘pre-
emption’) thesis explains the peremptory character of commands in terms of a 
hierarchical account of practical reasons. On this view, an authoritative command to 
j is intended to give its subject both an additional first-order reason for j-ing and a 
second-order exclusionary reason not to act on the basis of (some of) the pre-existing 
first-order j-related reasons. These reasons are supplanted by the command.  
Of course, the fact that commands are intended to play this role does not show that 
they do so. This second-step is provided by the second (‘normal justification’) thesis, 
according to which, 
 
the normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person 
involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with 
reasons which apply to him . . . if he accepts the directives of the alleged 
authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by 
trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly. (Raz, 1986, p.53) 
 
On this view, authority is justified in virtue of the rational gains it provides its subject. 
An authority is entitled to create new obligations by issuing commands because, and to 
the extent that, its having this ability the subject to better achieve aims they have 
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independent reason to achieve.14 Authorities can satisfy this test in two main ways. 
Firstly, obeying a common authority may enable individuals to better coordinate their 
behavior with one another, thereby resolving various collective action problems they 
may encounter in pursuing valuable aims. Secondly, an authority may possess greater 
expertise than the subject on certain morally important matters (where expertise is 
understood broadly, as the ability to issue directives that track right reason more reliably 
or efficiently than the subject is able to.)15  
The normal justification thesis thus offers a broadly instrumental account of 
authority, thereby responding to the anarchist’s worry that obedience necessarily 
conflicts with reason.16 Obeying an authority may simply be the optimal means of 
achieving one’s ends and, when so, obedience is justified (Raz, 2010, p.299).17 This 
idea also explains the pre-emptive character of authoritative commands: The subject 
best conforms to reason by allowing commands to replace their own practical 
assessment of certain considerations. It is easiest to illustrate this point in cases of 
expertise-based authorities (another, though broadly parallel, story has to be told with 
respect to coordinative authorities.) To put things somewhat crudely, such authorities 
are less likely than the subject to make mistakes as to what reason requires within an 
identifiable class of cases. Under these conditions, if the subject assigns its commands 
a pre-emptive role, she will achieve an identical level of success that the authority 
achieves. Alternatively, she could adopt a non-pre-emptive strategy, in which she 
simply gives the reasons that favor the action commanded some additional additional 
weight in her deliberations. In a sub-class of cases, this weight will tip the balance in 
favor of acting as commanded, and her rate of mistake will match the authority’s. In 
the remaining cases the command will not tip the balance and she will act according to 
her own assessment. Here, her rate of mistake will exceed the authority’s. Across the 
total class, then, the subject does worse than the authority. A weighing strategy can 
only serve to reduce her overall conformity with reason, compared to preemption. 
Instrumental reason thus dictates that commands have preemptive force (Raz, 1986, 
pp.67-69).18 
A service-based view also explains why mistaken commands – commands that fail 
to reflect the balance of reasons in a particular case – can still succeed in creating 
obligations. This is because authorities do not need to be infallible in order to serve 
their subjects. Provided the authority is better placed that the subject with respect to 
achieving conformity with reason, the subject still improves their overall performance 
by obeying. Crucially, subjects can only gain the benefits of authority if its commands 
remain binding even in certain cases where they fail to track right reason. For, in order 
to avoid acting against reason in such cases, the subject would have to rely on their own 
assessment of the relevant considerations. But such a policy requires forsaking the 
overall gains of obedience, since the authority meets the condition of normal 
justification despite its fallibility.  
To demonstrate, consider a simple case of advisory (rather than practical) authority, 
in which A has authority over B within the domain of financial investment. B will 
overall better maximize his returns by following A’s directives, rather than by acting 
on his own judgment. This is compatible with A, from time to time, mistakenly 
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directing B to make poor investments, costing B one hundred dollars each time. 
However, detecting these mistakes would require engaging in the same process of 
financial reasoning that B went through in each case. If B does so, and acts on his own 
judgment, he will overall do worse in terms of maximizing his returns, compared to a 
more general policy of obedience. B therefore has sufficient reason to act as A directs, 
including in cases where A errs.  
However, this doesn’t mean that all commands from a legitimate authority create 
reasons to obey. The validity of commands is limited in two respects on a service-based 
view (I discuss their limited weight in Section X). The first restricts the jurisdiction of 
authority. Given the value of autonomy, there will be a range of domains in which 
agents’ overriding rational aim is to choose for themselves, rather than achieve the 
‘optimal’ outcome. For example, one’s choice of leisure activity, romantic partner, 
religious affiliation, etc. Given the priority of autonomous choice in these areas, 
obeying an authority would be self-defeating. Such domains are just not ‘authority-apt’ 
and commands issued within them are void.19  
Service accounts also limit authority at the level of specific commands, as well as 
domains. Though directives may remain binding even if they fail to reflect right reason, 
this doesn’t mean that all mistaken directives bind. Service justifies obedience only to 
the extent necessary to optimize the subject’s overall conformity with reason. 
Commands that require obedience beyond this point are invalid. When disregarding a 
mistaken command does not incur a rational cost, the subject is free, in fact required, 
to do so. To illustrate, consider a variation on the financial advisor example, in which 
A mistakenly directs B to burn ten of his dollars. In this case, B can judge that the 
directive is mistaken without having to engage in any complex financial reasoning of 
the kind that A is superior to B at doing. He can therefore disregard it without forfeiting 
the benefits of generally following A’s directives. To clarify, whether a command’s 
departure from right reason serves to invalidate it does not depend on how large a 
mistake it is. In our pair of financial examples, B’s conforming to the first directive 
loses him ten times as much money as conforming to the second. Yet only the first is 
reason-giving. Instead, validity depends on the type of mistake. As Raz (1986, p.62) 
puts it, what matters is the clarity of a mistake, not its gravity. Only clear mistakes 
invalidate, because only disobeying clearly mistaken commands is compatible with 
optimizing one’s conformity with reason.20 
 
4. The Authority View of Harm 
My contention is that if we accept a service account of how the commands of authorities 
can ever create obligations, it is a relatively short step to accepting that the commands 
of authorities can give subjects sufficient reason to cause otherwise-unjustified harm, 
thus vindicating my first claim. I set out this argument below and discuss some of its 
intricacies in the next section. 
A service-based view provides a very general account of the justification of 
authority: A has authority over B within domain X, if obeying A’s commands enables 
B to better conform to the X-related reasons that apply to B. The argument from this 
general account to a defense of my first claim proceeds in four steps.  
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The first is to make one element of this three-place relation more specific: the 
domain of authority. Presumably, unless extreme pacifism is true, there are possible 
domains in which acting in accordance with reason may involve causing harm to others. 
Term such domains harm-apt. I mentioned two possible examples earlier – the domains 
of military service and law enforcement.  
The second step simply notes that agents operating in harm-apt domains may be 
differently situated regarding their abilities to assess and successfully bring about 
conformity with the harm-related reasons. Term this ‘agent-variability’.  
The third step combines the first two. Harm-aptness and agent-variability open up 
the possibility that agents may better conform with the harm-related reasons by obeying 
the commands of another, rather than by trying to conform to those reasons directly. 
This shows how one agent may acquire authority over another regarding the distribution 
of harm. Put differently, domains can be both harm-apt and authority-apt. If an agent 
will better distribute harm by obeying the commands of an authority, it seems 
uncontroversial that this is what they all-things-considered ought to do. 
A fourth and final step is required to support my first claim. This is provided by the 
fact that, as explained above, authorities can be legitimate despite their fallibility. 
Subjects can be all-things-considered required to obey commands that fail to reflect 
right reason. When an authority serves its subjects within a harm-apt domain binding, 
yet mistaken, commands may include those that require distributing harm in ways that 
are not justified on the basis of the authority-independent reasons.  
Term this four-stage argument the Authority View of Harm. To illustrate it, consider 
the following example: 
 
Volcano: A volcano erupts in Nation A. In order to save as many lives as possible the 
lava flow needs to be diverted from areas of higher population density to lower. This 
requires Nation A’s citizens to dig an integrated system of trenches, along which the 
lava can be redirected.  
 
Assume that Nation A’s citizens will do better in terms of saving lives by obeying their 
government on matters of lava-redirection, compared to not obeying. This may be due 
to the government’s ability to achieve coordination among its subjects (because 
whether any individual trench-digger contributes to successful lava redirection depends 
on what other trench-diggers do), or its expertise (it makes sufficiently good decisions 
regarding lava redirection), or a combination of both. According to the Authority View 
of Harm, Nation A’s government thereby acquires authority over its subjects regarding 
the domain of lava redirection. Nation A’s citizens have a duty to obey their 
government on matters of lava redirection, including certain commands that are 
mistaken and require harming innocents in the absence of a lesser-evil justification. 
Since this policy of obedience is their optimal means of distributing harm, they are 
morally required, all things considered, to do so. 
In summary: I have argued that if a broadly service-based view is defensible, a 
common and intuitive view about the moral limitation of authority is mistaken. It is not 
true, as a general matter, that commands to perform seriously wrongful actions 
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necessarily fail to generate all-things-considered obligations to obey. This result also 
denies the common assumption that justifications for harm fall into one of two 
categories, in which the reasons against harming are either vitiated or overridden. 
Instead, there exists an additional form of justification, in which these reasons are 
defeated by exclusion.  
Before moving on, it is worth considering an important objection to the Authority 
View.21 The objection holds that the subject’s reasons to obey are not of the right sort 
to justify causing harm. More specifically, it claims that if the reasons to obey an 
authority arise from its superior expertise, its commands only provide the subject with 
reasons to believe that their actions are justified, and not practical reasons to act as 
commanded. Hence, subjects are ‘justified’ in causing harm only in the ‘evidence-
relative’ sense, which may furnish them with an excuse for harming, but not a moral 
permission.  This specific worry echoes a more general objection that service accounts 
can only establish epistemic, and not practical, authority (see, for example, Darwall, 
2010). 
In response, it is not obvious that the reasons to obey an expertise-based authority 
can be straightforwardly reduced to reasons for belief, as the critic claims. This is 
because the subject’s epistemic aim of forming true beliefs about the world can come 
apart from her practical aim of improving their conformity with reason by obeying an 
expertise-based authority. For example, it may be that within an identifiable range of 
cases, the subject will more successfully form true beliefs about the balance of reasons 
in each case by rely solely on her own assessment, compared to deferring to the 
authority. Yet she may still do better in terms of conforming her behavior with right 
reason by obeying the very same authority. This could be because, although she may 
make fewer mistakes than the authority, the mistakes that she does make are more 
serious, such that acting on her assessments will yield worse practical results than a 
policy of obeying the authority, including (at least some of) its mistaken commands. 
Cases such as this suggest that one can have reason to obey an expertise-based 
authority, even if its directives do not provide reasons for forming beliefs. If so, the 
commands of such authorities create reasons for action, and so are capable of justifying 
behavior (including harmful behavior) more robustly than the mere evidence-relative 
sense. 
Though I am sympathetic to this line of response, more clearly needs to be said. 
Fortunately, a more straightforward response is also available. This simply points out 
that the objection has very limited scope, since it applies only in the case of authorities 
that are justified solely on the basis of expertise. But expertise is not the only, or even 
the main, way of justifying authority in terms of service. In many (perhaps most) cases, 
authorities are legitimated on the basis of their ability to enable their subjects to 
coordinate their actions with one another, so that they can better achieve morally 
important goals. 22 In the Volcano case, for example, whether each citizen successfully 
contributes to saving lives depends on coordinating their actions with others. The 
Authority View claims that if obeying an authority enables the required coordination, 
then the citizens are required to do so, including in (at least some) cases where the 
authority issues mistaken commands. For present purposes, the important point is that 
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reasons to coordinate are clearly practical reasons, and not merely reasons for belief. 
Given this, even if we concede that expertise-based authorities are merely epistemic 
authorities23, this does not significantly undermine the Authority View. At most, it 
reduces the range of cases in which authority-based justifications for harm apply.  
However, given that right action in many paradigmatic harm-apt domains (such as law 
enforcement and military action) will depend on coordination, this doesn’t seem 
especially troubling. 
 
5. The Moderate Objections Revisited 
This section refines the Authority View by explaining why the two moderate objections 
outlined above fail to refute my first claim. According to the Pro Tanto Objection, 
commands to cause unjustified harm are necessarily overridden by the duty not to 
transgress the basic rights of others. However, as the Authority View reveals, it is a 
mistake to treat all such cases in terms of a straightforward competition of reasons. In 
order for authorities to successfully serve their subjects, their commands must have the 
status of pre-emptive reasons, excluding the reasons on which they are based. This is 
equally true in harm-apt domains as in any other  
However, this does not mean that valid commands cannot be overridden by 
weightier first-order reasons. This is perfectly admissible on a service account, 
provided that the reasons in question do not fall within the authority’s jurisdiction (Raz, 
2009, p.144-146). To demonstrate, imagine that Smith has the aim of acting rightly on 
some morally important matter. The correct course of action depends on a trade-off 
between three distinct variables, X, Y and Z. Furthermore, imagine that an authority 
passes the test of normal justification regarding Smith within the domains of the X-
related and Y-related reasons, but not the Z-related reasons. Under these conditions the 
authority’s command excludes variables X and Y from Smith’s practical reasoning. But 
the command may perfectly permissibly be weighed against the Z-related reasons. 
Furthermore, it is entirely possible that the non-excluded Z-related reasons are 
sufficiently weighty to override the obligation created by the command, giving Smith 
all-things-considered reason to disobey. 
Given this, the Authority View is compatible with there being cases in which the 
Pro Tanto Objection gives an accurate picture of the normative situation. For example, 
in some contexts distributing harms correctly may require a trade-off between 
minimizing harm and distributing it equitably. In these cases, an authority might 
successfully serve its subjects regarding the (sub)domain of harm minimization, but not 
the (sub)domain of equity. Like all of us, authorities are typically better at some things 
than others. Under these conditions, commands to cause (or refraining from causing) 
harm only exclude reasons pertaining to harm-minimization. Equity-based 
considerations are not excluded and, in some cases, may be sufficiently important to 
outweigh the obligation created by the command. In cases like this, the subject will 
have both an obligation to inflict unjustified harm and a weightier countervailing reason 
not to do so. However, the important point is that while there may be many cases that 
have this structure, it is not true of all cases. This is what the Pro Tanto Objection 
requires if it is to refute my first claim. 
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The Invalidation Objection claims that an authority’s commands only create 
obligations if their content does not significantly depart from the balance of moral 
reasons. Authorities that issue such commands necessarily exceed their legitimacy. 
Hence, commands to impose harms (or at least sufficiently serious harms) that are not 
independently justified are void. The problem with this objection is that service 
accounts provide a very general model of how the moral power to create content-
independent obligations can be justified, which applies across different domains of 
reasons. Given this, it is hard to find a principled rationale for the localized denial of 
this power that the objection requires. If the aim of improving one’s conformity with 
reasons can ever explain why commands that require acting against the balance of pre-
existing reasons create obligations, why should it not also do so regarding the reasons 
that govern the distribution of harm? It is arbitrary to simply carve off this domain as 
immune from a service-based justification.  
However, this may be too quick. On a service-based view there are certain domains 
in which commands are necessarily and non-arbitrarily invalid: those in which 
choosing autonomously is more important than achieving optimal outcomes. One might 
then resurrect the Invalidation Objection by claiming that agents have more reason to 
distribute harms autonomously than optimally. In other words, harm-apt domains are 
never authority-apt.24 If so, commands to inflict unjustified harm would necessarily fail 
to create obligations.25 But this is very hard to believe. If there is any domain in which 
improving one’s conformity with reason trumps the value of exercising autonomy, it is 
surely that of harm-distribution. Appealing to autonomy cannot rescue the Invalidation 
Objection from the charge of arbitrariness.26  
The Invalidation Objection may also be revised in a different direction. As 
explained above, commands that are clearly mistaken create no reasons for action. 
Given this, one might argue that commands whose content seriously departs from the 
balance of moral reasons also constitute clear mistakes. This would provide a non-
arbitrary basis for the claim that commands to cause unjustified harm are invalid in 
virtue of their immoral content, since whether a command constitutes a clear mistake 
is determined by its content. However, on this revised view it is the clarity of a 
command’s departure from right reason, and not its immorality per se, that accounts for 
its invalidity. 
However, it is highly implausible that every command to cause otherwise-
unjustified harm also constitutes a clear mistake. In order for a command to qualify as 
a clear mistake, the subject must be able to determine that the command fails to reflect 
right reason without engaging in the same reasoning that the authority went through in 
producing its commands. Importantly, whether or not the subject can form such a 
judgment depends not only on the command’s content, but also on the particular domain 
in which the command is issued and the nature of the service that the authority provides. 
Given this contextual element, the very same command may constitute a clear mistake 
when issued in one domain, but not in another. Perhaps some commands constitute clear 
mistakes across all domains, such as those that require impossible actions (‘Do X and 
not-X! Now!’). But the claim that every command to inflict unjustified harm constitutes 
a clear mistake is surely false. Harm-apt domains are precisely those in which 
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determining that such commands are mistaken frequently (though not always) requires 
repeating the authority’s deliberations. 
Both the Pro Tanto and Invalidation Objections are thus unsuccessful in refuting 
my first claim. They do not fail because they misidentify ways in which authority is 
limited. Service accounts agree that the commands of authorities are limited in terms 
of both their weight and validity. Rather, they fail because they assume that the question 
of whether particular commands exceed those limits can be settled independently of a 
specific account of authority’s justification. I have argued that this is a mistake. On a 
service-based view, the scope and limits of the obligation to obey are calibrated to what 
is required for the authority to provide the relevant service. When the service consists 
in enabling subjects to better distribute harm, subjects can be required, all-things-
considered, to obey (at least some) commands to cause unjustified harm.   
 
6. Defending The Second Claim 
In what follows, I shift focus from the question the range of reasons that are capable of 
justifying harm, to that of how different agents’ reasons for harming interact. More 
specifically, if my first claim is defensible and authoritative commands can provide an 
independent source of justification, to what extent does an agent’s possession of an 
authority-based justification for causing unjust harm affect whether other agents are 
permitted to defensively harm the authorized agent? Whereas the preceding discussion 
centered on those who are subject to commands to cause harm, the following concerns 
the normative situation of those who are threatened by authorized agents.  
To recapitulate, within the literature on defensive harm several theorists defend the 
view I labelled Immunity, which holds that there is no justified defense against justified 
infringements of rights against harm. In opposition, I argue that authority-based 
justifications reveal Immunity to be mistaken. The fact that an agent is justified in 
causing unjust harm in virtue of being commanded does not, in itself, raise the 
justificatory burden on defensively harming that agent. Though denying Immunity is 
not an uncommon position in itself, the argument I offer is distinctive because it is 
compatible with certain commitments that are often taken to strongly support Immunity. 
Discussions of the permissibility of harming justified threateners typically focus on 
cases in which the threatener possesses an (impartial) lesser-evil justification for 
harming others. These provide a useful starting point for assessing the case of authority-
based justifications. A standard test case is the following: 
 
Tactical Bombers: A bomber crew are on a mission to destroy a munitions factory as 
part of a just war. Destroying the factory will result in the deaths of five innocent 
bystanders as a side-effect. However, the good achieved by bombing the factory is 
sufficient to justify doing so as the lesser evil. The five bystanders have access to an 
anti-aircraft gun and are able to shoot down the bombers before they drop their bombs. 
 
The question here is whether the bystanders are permitted to defensively kill the 
bombers, given that the bombers are justified in causing their deaths. While many hold 
that the bystanders would be so permitted (Hosein, 2014; Mapel, 2010; Rodin, 2011; 
	 12	
Steinhoff, 2008), others argue that the bombers’ justification entails that defense is 
impermissible (Frowe, 2015; McMahan, 2014; Tadros, 2011, ch.9). 
The debate between these two views often turns on one’s position on the range of 
justifications for harming. As explained above, justifications are standardly divided into 
agent-neutral and agent-relative. Agent-neutral justifications – such as defensive 
liability and (impartial) lesser-evil – apply to all agents, whereas agent-relative 
justifications – such as those grounded in permissible partiality – apply only to specific 
agents. If one takes the range of justifications to be thoroughly agent-neutral, then a 
commitment to Immunity follows quite naturally. If the reasons that determine how 
harm ought to be distributed in any particular case apply equally to all agents, then this 
gives every agent the common aim of seeing to it that that this distribution comes about, 
or at least not preventing it from coming about.27 For the agent-neutralist, it is 
contradictory to hold that certain agents may be justified in bringing about one 
distribution of harm, while others are justified in bringing about an opposing 
distribution.28 
Conversely, if one accepts the possibility of agent-relative justifications, then 
Immunity need not hold. If some forms of justification apply only to specific agents, 
there is no oddity in claiming that different parties can be simultaneously justified in 
harming one another. For example, while the bombers may possess a lesser-evil 
justification, the innocent bystanders may be justified in resisting on the basis of 
permissible self-partiality.  
 
7. Authorized Threateners and Immunity 
Let us now consider the permissibility of defense against authorized threateners. On 
first impression, it is tempting to endorse Immunity here and hold that the permissibility 
of violent resistance is precluded by their justification. This view is appealing because 
it generates the intuitively right result in a range of cases, such as the following: 
 
Police Officer: A police officer acts to arrest an individual as a result of a command to 
do so from a morally justified authority. However, the command is mistaken (but not 
clearly so) and the prospective arrestee is innocent. 
 
In this case, it seems impermissible for the arrestee to use defensive force against the 
police officer. Combining the Authority View of Harm with Immunity provides a neat 
explanation of why this is so. The Authority View allows us to characterize the police 
officer as posing a justified threat to the innocent arrestee, despite the fact that the harm 
is not justified by the command-independent reasons. The addition of Immunity allows 
us argue that the police officer’s justification for harming defeats the arrestee’s normal 
permission to resist aggression.29 Furthermore, this analysis also yields the intuitively 
right result in a variation on the case: 
 
Vigilante: A private individual acts to carry out a citizen’s arrest on the basis of a 
reasonable suspicion that the arrestee will otherwise commit a serious crime. However, 
they are mistaken and the prospective arrestee is innocent. 
	 13	
 
In this case it does seem intuitively justified for the arrestee to forcefully resist. Again, 
combining the Authority View with Immunity neatly explains this. Although, by 
hypothesis, both the police officer and the vigilante threaten an identical harm, only the 
police officer possesses a justification for doing so, because only the police officer 
threatens harm in conformity with an authoritative command. Though the vigilante may 
reasonably believe that they are justified in harming the arrestee, they in fact lack 
sufficient reason to do so. Since this analysis classifies the vigilante as a species of 
unjustified threatener, Immunity does not apply and resistance may then be justified 
(subject to the usual requirements of necessity and proportionality). 
However, other cases strongly suggest that Immunity does not hold in the case of 
authority-based justifications. Consider the following: 
 
Combatants: A group of combatants act to annex an area of territory belonging to a 
neighboring state as a result of legitimate command to do so. However, the command 
is mistaken (but not clearly so) and the invasion is unjustified.30  
 
In this case it seems clearly permissible for those threatened by the authorized agents 
to resist (or for third-parties to do so on their behalf). Yet applying Immunity to this 
case generates the opposite result. Surrender would be morally required, which is highly 
counter-intuitive.31 
The interaction question thus raises an important challenge for the idea of authority-
based justifications, in the form of a dilemma. Since, by hypothesis, both the police 
officer and the combatants possess the same form of justification for harming, we 
cannot claim that Immunity applies to one but not the other. Either Immunity holds in 
both cases – giving the wrong result in the Combatants case – or fails to apply in both 
cases – giving the wrong result in the Police Officer case.  
 
8. Authorized Threateners and Agent-Relativity 
I propose an account of interaction for authority-based justifications that aims to avoid 
the dilemma. The proposal has two parts. First, I argue that Immunity does not apply in 
the case of authority-based justifications for harming, thereby avoiding the first horn. 
Second, I provide an alternative and non-ad hoc account of why defense may be 
unjustified in cases such as Police Officer, thus avoiding the second horn. This section 
defends the first part; the following section argues for the second. 
Recall the above discussion of the relationship between views about the range of 
reasons that are capable of justifying harm and views about how those reasons interact 
interpersonally. Those who take the range of justifications to be thoroughly agent-
neutral are typically committed to Immunity as an account of interaction, whereas those 
who accept the existence of agent-relative justifications deny it. Given this, one strategy 
for denying that Immunity applies to authority-based justifications is to argue that the 
reasons that constitute the latter are agent-relative. Since agent-relative reasons need 
not affect the normative situation of other agents, the possession of an agent-relative 
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justification for bringing about a certain distribution of harm does not mean that others 
also have reason to bring about that distribution.  
The argument for this view is tentative, but fairly straightforward: authority-based 
justifications fit the standard characterization of agent-relative reasons. One can only 
give a full statement of the reason for action provided by a legitimate command by 
making explicit and ineliminable reference to a particular agent for whom it is a reason. 
When an authority issues a command to j this is not intended to bring a new reason for 
j-ing into existence for all agents generally, but only for the subject(s) of the command. 
Moreover, the agent-relativity of the reasons created by legitimate commands is 
particularly salient under service accounts of authority, which require the obligation to 
obey to be demonstrated anew with regard to each subject and their particular 
circumstances.32 On the view that legitimate authorities are those that enable 
individuals to compensate for various deficiencies and shortfalls in their practical 
reasoning, the justification of an individual’s obligation to obey must necessarily appeal  
to specific facts about that individual.  
If this characterization of authority-based justifications as agent-relative is 
defensible, we have the beginnings of an explanation of why Immunity does not hold 
in cases such as Combatants, thus avoiding the first horn of our dilemma. Though, by 
hypothesis, the combatants possess sufficient reason for causing harm, these reasons do 
not affect the normative situation of others, and so do not count against resistance.  
It may be objected that this claim is too strong.33 The objection proceeds from the 
following assumption: that all agents have a pro tanto reason to promote others’ 
conformity with reason, which includes enabling them to be served by authorities. 
Given this, one may claim that prospective victims (as well as third-parties) do in fact 
have some reason not to resist authorized threateners, because resistance would prevent 
the authorized agent from conforming to reasons that apply to them: those provided by 
their authority’s command. Hence, I am mistaken to claim that the authorized-
threatener’s justification does not count against resistance on the part of their victims. 
However, I don’t think this conclusion follows from the assumption. It may well be 
true that I have reason to promote all other agents’ conformity with reason, and that 
doing so may involve bringing it about that others are subject to authorities that serve 
them. But it does not follow from this that I necessarily have reason to promote others 
obeying authoritative commands, in cases where the command fails to reflect the 
balance of pre-existing reasons.34 While the subject of the mistaken command may have 
sufficient reason to obey it, they do so only because a policy of obedience is an optimal, 
though imperfect, means for them to achieve greater overall conformity with their 
ultimate reasons. When the strategy goes awry in particular cases, I should be guided 
by the subject’s ultimate reasons, not their instrumental reasons. Hence, in cases like 
Combatants, the victims’ aim of promoting others’ conformity with reason does not 
give them reason to refrain from resisting their attackers. If anything, it gives them 
reason to resist. 
Though the preceding points go some way towards showing why defensively 
harming authorized-threateners can be justified, but they are not yet sufficient for this 
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conclusion.35 While they may show that the reasons that justify the authorized 
threatener do not count against violently resisting them, it might still be the case that 
the fact that the threatener is justified does so. More specifically, it might be objected 
that the authorized threatener’s justification exempts them from liability to defensive 
harm. If so, this would impose a significant, perhaps even decisive, constraint on 
harming them. 
The first point to note in response is that the doctrine ‘justification defeats liability’ 
is controversial.36 One potential problem is that justification does not typically defeat 
other kinds of moral liability, such as liability to compensate ex post for causing harm.37 
The second, more substantial, point is that (as far as I am aware) those who endorse the 
doctrine have only explicitly defended it with respect to standard cases of impartial 
lesser-evil justifications, such as the Tactical Bombers. We should therefore be cautious 
in claiming that these arguments generalize to other forms of justification, and to 
authority-based justifications in particular. In fact, there are reasons to doubt that they 
do. Take, for example, the most sustained defense of the doctrine, put forward by Jeff 
McMahan. On McMahan’s view, the doctrine is grounded in a specific account of the 
basis of liability, according to which “the assignment of liability follows the distribution 
of harm in accordance with the demands of justice.” (McMahan, 2008, p.234). In the 
case of standard justified threateners, who have an impartial lesser-evil justification, 
“there is no reason that justice would demand that unavoidable harm be distributed 
towards them” (p.234), and so they are exempt from liability. While I find this view 
quite plausible, the rationale clearly does not apply to agents who possess authority-
based justifications, since precisely what these justify is acting contrary to the just 
distribution of harm.38 By the lights of McMahan’s account, authorized threateners 
should be liable to defensive harm. What this shows, I think, is that justification per se 
does not defeat liability (if indeed it defeats it at all). Rather, it depends on the kind of 
reasons that provide the particular justification. 
This argument regarding liability completes my case for denying Immunity in the 
case of authorized threateners. If defensible, my second main claim can be vindicated: 
an agent’s possession of an authority-based justification for causing harm does not, in 
itself, raise the justificatory burden for defensively harming that agent, compared to if 
they lacked that justification. Note that this is compatible with the possibility that 
independent factors other than their justification might constrain the permissibility of 
defense against authorized-threateners. Most obviously, authorized agents seem clearly 
non-culpable for threatening unjust harm. Though few theorists hold that non-culpable 
threateners escape liability39, many accept that a lack of culpability can count against 
the permissibility of defensive harm to some degree.  
Before moving on, it is worth highlighting two implications of the authority-based 
case for agent-relativity sketched above. Firstly, it suggests that agent-relative reasons 
can be generated even if it is true that the authority-independent reasons, upon which 
authoritative commands are based, are entirely agent-neutral. Even in a world populated 
solely by agent-neutral reasons, authorities may still serve their subjects by issuing 
commands that enable them to achieve greater conformity with those reasons. But the 
instrumental reasons created by these commands will be agent-relative. Authoritative 
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commands that are justified in this way may be understood as a species of ‘derivative’ 
agent-relative reasons. These are reasons for action that are specific to certain agents, 
but whose normative force is derived from their role in enabling that agent to conform 
to the ultimate, agent-neutral reasons.40 
Secondly, the Authority View provides a novel argument for both the existence of 
agent-relative justifications for harm and for the possibility of cases of symmetrically 
justified harming. Unlike existing agent-relative accounts of permissible harm, the 
Authority View makes no appeal to considerations of partiality, and so may avoid the 
standard objections pressed against these accounts.  
 
9. Authority and Constraints 
The preceding section sought to show how we can avoid the first horn of our dilemma. 
An additional argument is required to avoid the second horn: that defensively harming 
authorized agents is straightforwardly justified in cases such as Police Officer, in which 
resistance seems intuitively impermissible. This conclusion seems forced on us if, as I 
claim, Immunity does not apply in the case of authority-based justifications. This final 
section aims to provide a plausible and non-ad hoc account of why resisting authorized 
threateners may be impermissible in such cases, which does not appeal to the fact that 
the threatener is justified (this would simply return us to the first horn of the dilemma).  
In the paper so far, I have focused on one important normative consequence of 
authoritative commands: the creation of a justification for causing harm where none 
existed antecedently. In order to explain why resisting authorized threateners is 
sometimes impermissible we need to look at the wider range of normative 
consequences that authoritative commands can effect. In particular, in addition to 
providing agents with decisive reasons to perform actions that would otherwise be 
unjustified, commands may also create decisive reasons to refrain from performing 
actions that would otherwise be justified. If the idea of authority-based justifications for 
harming is defensible, the possibility of authority-based constraints should also be. 
Once we recognize this additional possibility, we have the resources for explaining 
why, in cases like Police Officer, it may be impermissible to resist an authorized 
threatener. The key feature of such cases is that the command that harm be caused is 
addressed to both the agent who carries out the harmful action and the agent who will 
suffer the resulting harm.  Given this, the command may affect the normative situation 
of both agents. In particular, the command [Joe be arrested!] may give the police officer 
a decisive reason to inflict the harm of arrest on Joe and give Joe a decisive reason not 
to exercise his normal right of self-defense. This additional moral power to constrain 
the use of force may also be justified on service-based grounds (though other forms of 
justification are possible). For example, an authority’s having this power may enable 
subjects to achieve the coordinative and adjudicative benefits of a system of law.41 It is 
this dual exercise of authority, I contend, which explains why resisting authorized-
threateners is impermissible in certain cases.42 
To clarify, the appeal to authority-based constraints is not a tacit reaffirmation of 
Immunity. It’s true that both the authorized agent’s justification for causing harm and 
their victim’s lack of justification for resisting share the same origin: an authoritative 
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command issued by a common authority. But these normative consequences are 
entirely independent of each other. We can see this by noting that agents can be subject 
to authority-based constraints on resistance even if the aggressors lack any justification. 
Consider the following: 
 
Invasion: Nation A is facing wholly and clearly unjustified annexation of part of its 
territory by a more powerful neighbor, Nation B. A’s government has service-based 
authority over its citizens regarding the domain of national defense and, after assessing 
the expected costs and benefits, commands its citizens not to militarily resist B’s agents.  
 
Assume for the sake of argument that resistance by Nation A’s citizens is rendered 
impermissible by the authority’s command.43 This prohibition is clearly not brought 
about by justification on the part of the aggressors, since they lack any justification 
whatsoever. Cases such as this demonstrate that authority-based constraints on defense 
are entirely separable from the moral status of the threatened harm. 
 
10. Conclusion 
Reflection on the relationship between the justification of harm and the justification of 
authority reveals that certain widely held views about the morality of harm and the 
limits of the obligation to obey require revision. A complete theory of permissible harm 
will need to make space for both authority-based justifications and authority-based 
constraints. 
 
1 For written comments on versions of this paper, I am extremely grateful to Yitzhak Benbaji, Christopher 
Bennett, Cécile Fabre, Adil Ahmed Haque, Jamie Kelly, James Lenman, Jeff McMahan, Jonathan 
Quong, Massimo Renzo, Daniel Statman, Victor Tadros, and especially Daniel Viehoff. The paper also 
benefitted from stimulating discussions at a workshop on Victor Tadros’ The Ends of Harm; The 
Association for Legal and Social Philosophy Annual Conference; the Oxford War Discussion Group; the 
inaugural conference of the Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace; and seminars at the 
University of Sheffield and the University of Toronto. I would also like to thank two anonymous 
reviewers for Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy for their extremely perceptive and helpful 
comments. Work on this paper was supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (UK) and 
the Society for Applied Philosophy. 
2 An exception being a recent pair of articles by Malcolm Thorburn (2008) and John Gardner (2010), 
though these focus primarily on the relevance of authority to criminal law defences for causing harm.  
David Estlund (2007) also provides an important discussion, which this paper builds upon. 
3 For a detailed discussion of the nature of these intentions, see Enoch (2011; 2014). 
4 As Helen Frowe puts it, more precisely: “Lesser-evil justifications obtain when one will prevent 
substantially more harm than one causes, such that the disparity between the harm and the good overrides 
the deontological presumption against causing harm.” (Frowe, 2015, p.274). 
5 For a lucid overview of the agent-neutral/agent-relative distinction, see Ridge (2011). 
6 See, for example, Davis (1984), Quong (2009), and Lazar (2013). 
7 For example, one of the most thorough recent discussions, which “points tantalizingly” towards a 
“grand unified theory” of permissible harming, consists almost entirely in an analysis of liability and 
lesser-evil justifications (Rodin, 2011, p.110). 
8 See, for example, Tadros (2011, ch.9), McMahan (2014), and Frowe (2015). For further discussion, see 
Waldron (2000). Note that Immunity does not rule out cases in which two or more agents may be 
permitted to defensively harm one another as a result of waiving their rights against harm (as in boxing 
matches for example) since these are not cases of rights infringements. 
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9 It is worth distinguishing my first claim from an uncontroversial sense in which commands might seem 
to justify causing otherwise-unjustified harm. To demonstrate, consider a case in which failing to obey a 
command to cause unjust harm will result in a bad consequence occurring. Perhaps, if disobeyed, the 
commander will unleash their wrath on innocent people. If this bad consequence is sufficiently grave 
then the subject may well be justified in acting as commanded. However, in such cases, while the 
command results in reasons for action that justify causing harm, the command itself does not create those 
reasons. Rather, the existence of the command simply affects non-normative facts so as to activate an 
ordinary lesser-evil justification. For discussion of this distinction, see Estlund (2008, p.118) and Enoch 
(2014). 
10 For the most influential formulation of the paradox, see Wolff (1970). 
11 On this distinction, see Christiano (2008, pp.261-262). 
12 For explicit defence of this view, see Knowles (2007). 
13 For versions of this view, see McMahan (2009, p.88) and Stilz, (2014, p.333 fn.22). 
14 Some object that this way of justifying authority fails because it cannot account for the idea that having 
authority necessarily involves a claim right to rule that correlates with the subject’s duty to obey (Darwall 
2009; 2010). However, it is far from obvious that authority does require such a right, rather than a power 
to create duties. For (in my view) convincing refutations, see Enoch (2014), Marmor (2011b) and Raz 
(2010). As these authors point out, in many (perhaps most) cases it seems far more morally attractive to 
say that the duty to obey an authority is owed to those that the authority’s powers are meant to benefit, 
rather than to the authority itself. To this, let me add that this seems especially plausible when it comes 
to the specific application of a service account that I argue for, in which the authority’s purpose is to 
enable its subjects to better distribute harms. 
15 An authority may also serve its subject by reducing the burdens of deliberation (Raz, 2009, pp.149-
150). I will leave this possibility aside, since this ground of authority is unlikely apply in the contexts I 
will be discussing.  
16 Though common, this characterisation is an oversimplification, since service accounts can 
accommodate non-instrumental reasons to obey (see Viehoff, 2011). However, since the cases I discuss 
are not of this type, I will continue to characterise service accounts as instrumental. 
17 Some argue that the Normal Justification Thesis does not provide a sufficient condition for legitimate 
authority, because genuine authority must also be conferred by some institutional norm or practice 
(Marmor, 2011a; 2011b), or at least recognized by some informal social practice (Enoch, 2014).  I am 
unsure whether this is true, but for the purposes of this paper we need not settle the matter, since my 
specific conclusions about harm do not require that the Normal Justification Thesis be sufficient. Each 
of these putative necessity conditions are compatible with the view that that service plays a significant 
role in the justification of authority, whether or not it is sufficient (Enoch, for example, is fairly explicit 
that his view can be understood as a friendly modification of the service conception). This is all that my 
argument requires. If it turns out that authority does require institutions or social practices, then my 
conclusions are accordingly limited to those contexts. However, given that the questions motivating this 
paper are most likely to arise in precisely those contexts, this doesn’t seem particularly worrying. 
18 In addition, pre-emption can also be defended via an argument from double-counting. Since, on a 
service account, valid commands are wholly grounded the reasons that apply to the subject, subjects 
cannot simultaneously be subject to a command and the reasons upon which it is based, because these 
reasons have already been accounted for in producing the command (Raz, 1986, pp.58-59). 
19 In his more recent writings, Raz (2009, p.137) terms this restriction the ‘independence condition’. For 
earlier statements, see Raz (1986, p.57; 1989, p.1180). For detailed discussion, see Tucker (2012). 
20 It is worth pointing out that commands can be invalidated as clear mistakes even if the subject only 
finds themselves in a position to form the relevant judgment by accident or good fortune. 
21 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to address this objection. 
22 Some have objected that achieving coordination does not require authorities with the power to impose 
duties, but only that one course of action be made salient (Green, 1983; 1985). However, as Raz (1989) 
points out, this seems true only in extremely specific kinds of coordination problems, in which the 
participants satisfy certain subjective conditions. 
23 In his most recent writings on the topic, Raz seems willing to concede this (Raz, 2010). 
24 This version of the Invalidation Objection thus denies the third step in the four-stage argument for my 
first claim. 
25 The revised objection is actually broader than the original, since it would also invalidate commands to 
cause justified harm. 
26	I think this response also suggests how the Authority View can respond to a more general class of 
objections to service accounts. These objections maintain that service accounts fail to give a plausible 
general account of political authority, because they give insufficient attention to the role that procedural 
	 19	
																																																																																																																																																											
considerations play in justifying authority (such as fairness, democracy, public reason, etc.), focusing 
instead on the value of the outcome of following the authority’s directives (see, for example, Christiano 
(2004); Hershovitz (2003); Quong (2011); Waldron (1999)). While I think these objections are mistaken 
and that service accounts are flexible enough to accommodate procedural values (see Viehoff, 2011; 
2014), the point I want to highlight is that when it comes to the distribution of serious harms, 
considerations of outcome are intuitively paramount. So, when restricted specifically to harm-apt 
domains, the case for justifying authority in terms of service is at its most compelling.26 Some critics 
seem wiling to concede this. For example, Jonathan Quong, who is otherwise critical of service accounts, 
agrees that they provide a convincing account of the justification of authority within fairly narrow 
domains of morally important reasons, such as those constituted by our basic rights and duties vis-à-vis 
one another (Quong, 2011, ch.4). This will presumably include the moral reasons governing the 
distribution of harm. 
27 For the characterisation of agent-neutrality in terms of common aims, see Parfit (1984, p.27).  
28 For example, Victor Tadros (2011, ch.9) defends a thoroughly agent-neutral view of permissible 
harming in general and explicitly appeals to this view in order to reject the possibility of symmetrically 
justified harming (with the exception of cases in which the conflict is itself agent-neutrally valuable, such 
as in certain sporting contests).   
29 This is not to deny that there are alternative explanations of the intuition that it is impermissible for 
the innocent arrestee to resist that are compatible with Completeness. For example, defence may be futile 
or counter-productive, given that other police officers will act to make the arrest even if the initial 
arresting officer is successfully resisted. In my view, such explanations are unsatisfactorily contingent. 
Thanks to James Lenman and Jeff McMahan for raising this point. 
30 See Estlund (2007) for further discussion of this sort of case. 
31 The right to resist all forms of military aggression has recently come under sustained criticism, so it is 
not necessarily counter-intuitive to claim that resistance may be unjustified in a case like the one 
described above (see, especially, Rodin, 2014). However, what is counter-intuitive, even on the most 
pacifistic views, is the conclusion that resistance may be unjustified because the aggressors act with 
justification. Hence, the oddity of the conclusion generated by applying Immunity in the Combatants 
case can be appreciated regardless of one’s position on the right to resist military aggression. 
32 On the idea that authority is ‘piecemeal’ in this way, see Raz (1986, p.71 & p.80.) 
33 This objection has been put to me, independently, by Massimo Renzo and Yitzhak Benbaji. 
34 On the assumption that the mistaken directive is not also binding on me. This is an important caveat, 
which I discuss in the next section. 
35 Thanks to two anonymous referees for helping me see this. 
36 This slogan is Jeff McMahan’s. Note that the doctrine is weaker than Immunity, since it is compatible 
with it being permissible to defensively harm justified threateners on grounds other than liability.  
37 An objection made by Steinhoff (2008) and Rodin (2011), who reject the doctrine. For responses, see 
McMahan (2008). 
38 Though I cannot argue for it here, I suspect that this may also be true of agent-relative justifications 
more generally, or at least those grounded in prerogatives to show partiality towards one’s own interests 
(see Quong, 2009). These justifications can also be characterized as granting defenders a permission to 
act against the just distribution of harm. So if, as McMahan claims, liability tracks the just distribution 
of harm, the prerogative should not defeat liability. 
39 For a notable exception, see Lazar (2009). 
40 For discussion of this type of reason see, Gardner (2007, p.65) and Hooker (2000, p.110). 
41 For a discussion of how authorities may serve their subjects on grounds of adjudication, see Viehoff 
(2011). 
42 Of course, authority-based constraints will not always be decisive. For example, in cases where the 
authority’s power to impose this constraint is grounded in its enabling subjects to better comply with 
their reasons to coordinate with others and adjudicate disagreements impartially, the constraint may be 
overridden by countervailing considerations that fall outside this domain, such as the costs the subject 
would have to bear by obeying. My argument can thus accommodate the intuition that if the harm faced 
by Joe were more serious – long term imprisonment for example – then he may be morally justified in 
resisting, despite being commanded not to. 
43 For a different argument for the possibility of such cases, see Stilz (2014). 
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